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Abstract: ​In the concept of European citizenship, public and international law                     
intersect. The unity of the European polity results from the interplay between                       
national and European loyalties. Citizens’ allegiance to the European polity depends                     
on how much they see the polity’s identity as theirs. Foundational ideals that shaped                           
the European project’s identity included social reconciliation and peaceful                 
coexistence, economic reconstruction and widespread prosperity, and the creation of                   
supranational structures to rein in nationalism. A broad cultural consensus underlay                     
the first impulse for integration. Europeans had little trouble giving explicit or tacit                         
allegiance to such a project, which resulted in an unparalleled success. However,                       
roughly 60 years and 20 Member States later, social integration is being challenged as                           
immigrants with diverse cultural backgrounds arrive, while far-right political parties                   
surge in reaction; economic integration is confronted with a faltering euro and                       
countries struggling to meet financial commitments; and political integration                 
weakens as the EU seems to fail the democratic test. Cultural assumptions are no                           
longer shared by all. Allegiance to today’s EU is problematic for the ordinary                         
European citizen. This paper submits that careful attention to the spirit of the                         
foundational ideals sheds light on how the present problems as well as future                         
integration could and should be approached. 
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In August 2010, European Union (EU) budget commissioner Janusz Lewandowski                   
declared that many Member States wanted to be “unburdened” of their contributions                       
to the EU. Due to the difficult economic times, they wished to reduce those payments.                             
This situation, in Mr Lewandowski’s view, was opening the door “to think about                         
revenues that are not claimed by finance ministers”.​3 Spain, Austria, Poland and                       
Belgium seemed initially sympathetic to the idea. The Netherlands, UK, Germany and                       
France were not impressed. The controversy so opposed the European Council against                       
the European Parliament and the European Commission, that approval of the 2011 EU                         
budget was compromised.​4 This debate about “own resources”​5 would imply the                     
creation, for the first time, of direct EU taxes.​6 
Probably the number of EU citizens who—moved by romantic Euro-patriotism—                   
would lose sleep over the consideration of giving or not their lives for the EU, is not                                 
overwhelming. But, could their commitment motivate them to at least pay EU taxes?​7                         
The following paper will try to delve into the question on how allegiance and identity                             
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play out in the intersection of global, regional and domestic contexts, affecting a                         
concrete legal form of political belonging: EU citizenship. 
Allegiance to “Europe” (or, more accurately, the EU) is more problematic than, say,                         
commitment to a nation state, due to the nature of the European polity. The EU                             
cannot claim to possess attributes that provoke strong (or at least significant)                       
identification from its citizens. Elsewhere I have suggested that if there is a European                           
identity, it a nuanced one, much less intense than national identities, and                       
subordinated to them.8 This is why the legal figure of European citizenship especially                         
when one focuses on the affiliative dimension of citizenship—regarding sense of                     
belonging—presents a most interesting case in the study of the interactions between                       
international and public law, between domestic and transnational identities, and                   
between the allegiance to nation and to community of nations. 
Furthermore, allegiance to Europe may mean not only adhesion to a set of institutions                           
that inspire more or less enthusiasm—the occasional reference to “Brussels” as                     
alleged centre of decisions with European reach—but also as the source and symbol                         
of certain historical memories, cultural and religious traditions, and social and                     
economic ways of life shared by Europeans and by those who, in parts of the world as                                 
distant as Canada, Argentina or Australia, consider themselves part of European                     
(often called “Western”) civilisation.​9 In this sense, “Europe” could in fact receive the                         
allegiance of citizens in many nations not only inside, but also outside its geographical                           
limits. 
This paper focuses on the political identity of the EU—having to do, therefore, with                           
the citizens, the polity, and one among several aspects of what makes the former feel                             
part of the latter: its political culture. To that end, I will explore first the foundational                               
ideals on which membership to the European project (much before the creation of EU                           
citizenship) was based. I will argue that those ideals gave a certain configuration, an                           
identity, to that project, and that such identity received the allegiance of the                         
Europeans participating in it. In the second section, I will review some problems that                           
the project faces at the present, and how they relate to the foundational ideals, the                             
identity of the project (today the EU), and the allegiance of its members (EU citizens)                             
to it. In the third and final part, I will advance normative arguments for the future of                                 
the European project, using as reference, again, the identity of the polity and the                           
allegiance of its members to it. 
1 Original integration paradigms 
According to Joseph Weiler, the European Communities (which would evolve into the                       
EU) were created with three goals in mind: social integration (reconciliation and                       
peaceful coexistence); economic integration (reconstruction and widespread             
prosperity); and political integration (restraint of nationalism through supranational                 
structures).​10 These elements constituted the purpose or telos of integration, as can be                         
seen in the Schuman Declaration: 
World peace cannot be safeguarded without…creative efforts... The               
contribution, which an organised and living Europe can bring to                   
civilisation, is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations…                 
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be                                 
built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto                   
solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the                     
elimination of the...opposition [between] France and Germany.​11 
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The first and main purpose was to attain peace and reconciliation between France                         
and Germany, but as a step towards ‘‘the coming together of the nations of Europe”                             
and in the wider context of world peace. 
In order to start a process towards reconciliation, peace and European solidarity, the                         
Schuman Declaration proposed to create a supranational institution, initially                 
Franco-German but open to other countries of Europe: a common High Authority to                         
regulate the production of coal and steel.​12 This in turn would provide ‘‘common                         
foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe” and                           
solidarity so that ‘‘any war between France and Germany” became “not merely                       
unthinkable, but materially impossible”.​13 
The three goals were, in practical order: economic first (‘‘pooling basic production” of                         
coal and steel); political second (‘‘instituting the new High Authority” whose decisions                       
would bind France, Germany and other European countries); and social third (the                       
proposal would lead towards ‘‘a…federation indispensable to the preservation of                   
peace”).​14 However, their importance followed an inverse order: economic                 
cooperation was an instrument for political unity, which, in turn, would be a means                           
towards the attainment and keeping of the social goal of peace. 
Prosperity, the moderation of nationalism, and peace were, in Weiler’s view,                     
objectives with more than a purely utilitarian intent. They were ideals: a set of values,                             
which could captivate the imagination of Europeans, mobilise broadly- based political                     
forces, and counteract the powerful pull of nationalism.​15 And those were not just any                           
values, but ‘‘higher” ones: desiderata that were altruistic (not self- serving, but                       
implying a sacrifice), ethical (virtuous) and communitarian (needing the cooperation                   
of all). These four characteristics appear as features qualifying the foundational high                       
values or ideals in Table 1. 
Underlying those three ideals or goals was a basic, broad moral consensus with                         
shared—or at least to a certain extent compatible—worldviews.​16 Because that                   
cultural atmosphere was obvious to most, it required little discussion or specification:                       
it simply was assumed. At the heart of such European culture of the 1950s were the                               
religious tradition of the Bible (or Judeo-Christianity​17​) and the secular tradition of the                         
Enlightenment.​18 
Table 1 provides a schematic view of the ideals and features described so far. The                             
social ideal contained peace as desideratum, with an altruistic view to reconciliation,                       
exercising the virtue of collective forgiveness (inasmuch as that was possible), and                       
requiring an effort of all of the European peoples to translate those ideals into their                             
daily coexistence. The economic ideal presented the desideratum of prosperity, with                     
an altruistic aim to seek improvement for everybody so that each one could lead                           
materially dignified existences. Such goal required practicing the virtue of solidarity,                     
and the creation of common mechanisms to allow the flow of goods, services and                           
eventually labour, while keeping possible undesirable outcomes of the market forces                     
in check, at the service of European societies. Finally, the political ideal presented the                           
desideratum of unity, with an altruistic will of supranationality, practicing the virtue                       
of moderation regarding nationalism, and with a European—as well as a                     
national—perspective in view. All along, an underlying normative atmosphere,                 
drawing inspiration from Bible and Enlightenment values, provided a medium—a                   
sort of common language in an analogical sense—for mutual understanding and                     
3 
 
Should Europeans Citizens Die—Or at Least Pay Taxes—for Europe? 
working together. 
 
Table 1 – Original ideals and their features 
 
Feature 
 
Ideal 
Desideratu
m 
Altruistic  Ethical  Communitaria
n 
Social  Peace  Reconciliation  Forgiveness Coexistence 
Economic  Prosperity  Equality  Solidarity  Social market 
Political  Unity  Supranationalis
m 
Moderation  Co-sovereignty 
Political culture: Basic moral consensus 
Bible/Enlightenment 
 
The table has only illustrative purposes. It does not pretend to give an exhaustive                           
account of the ideals referred to by Weiler, but rather to show them in synthesis.​19 A                               
short explanation of the terms, however, should be made.​20 “Social”, for instance, can                         
be used in very different ways. Thus, “European Social Model” might refer to the legal                             
recognition of benefits that are expressed in economic outcomes (say, an                     
unemployment monetary aid). “Culture” might be interpreted as the knowledge and                     
behaviour of a certain elite, or as the expression of average Europeans through                         
different kinds of arts (even graffiti), or as specific ethnic and linguistic expression.                         
Likewise, “reconciliation” could be considered as much a social as a political quality. 
In this paper, “social” is understood as related to society, and this latter one as “the                               
aggregate of people living together in a more or less ordered community.”​21 “Social”                         
then is related to the community of people living together. How they subsist                         
materially, how they create and distribute wealth is left to the “economic” sphere.                         
How they govern themselves as a collective is placed in the “political” realm. Because                           
of that “reconciliation”, “forgiveness” and “coexistence” are seen here as part of the                         
social ideal of how the aggregate of Europeans can live together in harmony. 
“Economic” refers to either economics or to the economy. “Economy” means “the                       
state of a country or region in terms of the production and consumption of goods and                               
services and the supply of money”, or the “careful management of available                       
resources”.​22 “Economics” is “the branch of knowledge concerned with the                   
production, consumption, and transfer of wealth.”​23 “Economic” therefore is an                   
adequate adjective for the ideal that has to do with material prosperity, its                         
distribution (equality) and its production (the so called “social market economy”). 
“Political” relates to “the government or public affairs of a country”​24 and derives                         
from “politics”, which can be understood as “the activities associated with the                       
governance of a country or area...”​25 And “governing” is to “conduct the policy,                         
actions, and affairs of (a state, organization, or people) with authority.”​26 In this                         
context, issues of sovereignty, moderation of nationalism, political unity and                   
supranationalism fall under the political idea. 
Finally, the cultural background existing at the beginnings of the European                     
communities was certainly not an ideal, not even an atmosphere explicitly                     
acknowledged, but a shared assumption. “Cultural” relates, among other things, to                     
“the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a society,”​27 Arguably, those ideas,                       
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customs and behaviour of a society are normatively informed by a weltanschauung,                       
or “…particular philosophy or view of life.”​28 It is to this aspect of culture that I would                                 
like to refer. Notice that, from this perspective, culture as a worldview is not a                             
separated segment, but an atmosphere that finds manifestation in the most relevant                       
realms of a community’s existence, including its political, social and economic life as I                           
have defined them here. 
1.1 The social ideal: security and ​pax europaea 
After a conflagration like the Second World War, the goal of peace could have hardly                             
surprised anyone. It was obvious that nobody wanted another event like that. Europe                         
could not afford it. However, Weiler believes that the kind of peace that the founders                             
of the European project had in mind was more than a purely utilitarian goal: it                             
possessed the features of an ideal. It was a call not only to stop the violence, but also                                   
to forgive and to overcome hatred. ‘‘The Schuman notion of peace” in Weiler’s view,                           
‘‘resonates with and is evocative of the distinct discourse, imagery and values of                         
Christian love”, which was natural in that historical context and given the personal                         
backgrounds of such founding fathers as Adenauer, De Gasperi, Monnet and Schuman                       
himself.​29 
Peace certainly was a desideratum. However, it contained as well an altruistic                       
element, an implied sacrifice beyond the appeasement mood of the 1930s. It required                         
therefore the exercise of virtues: for example overcoming the desire for revenge and                         
for the humiliation of the former enemy. It was, finally, only attainable through an                           
effort involving the community of European nations—France and Germany first, then                     
the Six, and so on.​30 
1.2 The European economic ideal 
That the European project in its beginnings had economic goals is hardly debatable.                         
Indeed, for some this was the only purpose. After all, until the 1990s even though the                               
proper way to refer to the project was ‘‘European (Coal and Steel, Atomic Energy, and                             
Economic) Communities”, it was often called simply ‘‘the Economic Community” with                     
the Common Market as its most distinctive attribute. One of its better-known symbols                         
in the 2000s decade was going to be its new currency – the euro. Yet Weiler’s assertion                                 
that the economic aspect involved an ideal beyond pure self-interest is less obvious. 
For him the economic reconstruction of the devastated continent was ‘‘intimately                     
connected with the notion of peace”.​31 Firstly, because prosperity was a condition for                         
peace. But secondly, because mediating the utilitarian aspects of prosperity was an                       
altruistic element, evident when contrasted with the destruction and poverty of                     
Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War: the element of individual and                           
social dignity. Under the Enlightenment vision of the individual, ‘‘poverty resonates                     
with the embarrassment of dependence on others, with the humiliation bred by                       
helplessness, and with the degradation of a lack of autonomy”.​32 
There was indeed virtue in the pursuit of prosperity as a means to promote the                             
dignity of individuals, regions, nations, and Europeans as a whole. Prosperity won                       
through hard work and effort, as well as through cooperation with other individuals                         
and nations. Such cooperation ‘‘inevitably blunted the sharp edges of avidity feelings”                       
that might appear along the enterprise of prosperity building. Here the                     
communitarian feature of the economic ideal was important. The Community aimed                     
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at reconstruction with a sense of collective responsibility. It ‘‘attempted to constrain                       
the unchecked search for economic prosperity by one Member State at the expense of                           
the others”.​33 Thus, the processes of liberalisation of barriers and open markets at                         
which the European project aspired were conceived, at the same time, in a context of                             
solidarity. This communitarian notion of prosperity was rooted in a strong tradition                       
propounding an ethos of collective social responsibility for the welfare of individuals                       
in the community as a whole. A tradition originated in the XIX century, and which for                               
Weiler includes socialism.​34 Social Democracy is an outstanding example of this                     
tradition in Europe.​35 
1.3 The European political ideal 
Weiler has called the third ideal of European integration ‘‘supranationalism”.​36                   
Supranationalism can be interpreted in at least two ways, depending on how political                         
integration is envisaged: either as a union or as a community. Both the European                           
Defence Community and the European Political Community were planned as unions                     
and failed.​37 Based on this fact, and attending to the articulation of supranationalism                         
under the Treaties of Rome in 1957, Weiler feels more inclined to favour the                           
community perspective. Among other problems of the union approach, he mentions                     
how ironic it would be if the process of integration that sought to rein in the excesses                                 
of the nation state resulted in a super-state. 
The community vision, on the one hand, affirms ‘‘the values of the liberal nation state                             
by policing the boundaries against abuse”. On the other hand it also ‘‘seeks to redefine                             
the very notion of boundaries of the state, between the nation and the state and                             
within the nation itself.”​38 The union vision is liberal and federal (and can be                           
utilitarian as well); the community vision is communitarian and hybrid. The unity                       
vision entails the end of supranationalism, the check on nationalisms and statisms,                       
because it creates a super-state.​39​ The community vision advocates a stateless polity.​40 
At any rate, supranational cooperation was from the beginning a desideratum: it                       
meant moderating the excesses of nationalism; or more precisely, those of states                       
trying to advance their ‘‘national interest” in the European arena. It aimed at the                           
creation of a transnational atmosphere where individual nation states became linked                     
to the other nation states of the European Communities, so that the main                         
distinguishing category between peoples ceased to be their sense of belonging to a                         
nation state. This is for Weiler ‘‘the value side of non-discrimination on grounds of                           
nationality, of free movement provisions and the like.”​41 Therefore supranationalism                   
at the level of nation states ‘‘pushes for cultural differences to express themselves in                           
their…spontaneous form, rather than the codified statal legal forms.” And at the                       
intra-group level (within each nation state) ‘‘it attempts to strip the false                       
consciousness which nationalism may create instead of belongingness derived from a                     
non-formal sense of sharedness.”​42 
Supranationalism in this sense entails also an altruistic aim for Europeans to see each                           
other in terms that go beyond the usual category of state-nationality. Weiler sees in                           
this supranationalism an heir to the Enlightenment in its privileging of the value of                           
every human individual, expressed for example in the liberal notion of human                       
rights.​43 In addition, as in the case of the ideals of peace and prosperity,                           
supranationalism could not be attained by nation states separately: it required the                       
assent and collaboration of all of them. 
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1.4 Political culture: the basic moral consensus 
The shared worldview or, to use in Anderson’s terms, ​44 the “basic moral consensus”                           
that allowed Europeans to start the project of integration was based on two main                           
cultural traditions—those of the Bible and of the Enlightenment—often in conflict but                       
not altogether incompatible with each other.​45 Actually, because of their contrast, they                       
served to keep a certain cultural balance in the European communities even as they                           
included more and more countries. The role of the Enlightenment or humanistic                       
secularism is generally acknowledged as part of the make-up of Europe in general                         
and of the EU in particular, with roots that can be traced back to the French                               
Revolution and more in general to the beginnings of Modernity.​46 The role of                         
Christianity, not only as a question of heritage from Classical and Medieval history,                         
but as a specific and essential force propelling European integration in the second                         
half of the 20th century, has been less studied. 
Shelledy argues that international scholars have until recently lagged behind at                     
incorporating religion and religious organisations into their studies “with the same                     
level of analytic rigor and empirical investigation” with which they “address other                       
facets of human existence.”​47 This role includes, but is not limited to the views                           
religious leaders have expressed about the European project.​48 It is related, but not                         
fully explained, by the empirical allegiance of Christians to European integration.​49 
For Dougherty, Christian figures like Thomas Hooker, Roger Williams or John Wise                       
were at least as influential as Enlightenment characters such as John Locke for the                           
ideological foundations of the United States. Similarly, she assigns a key role to                         
Christianity in the formation of European democracies after World War II, in the                         
writing of their basic law and—eminently through the work of Christian philosopher                       
Jacques Maritain—in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ​50                       
Dougherty advances that, thanks to the political reconciliation of Catholics and                     
Protestants, Christianity was essential to the construction of German democracy and                     
in the configuration of the EU.​51 
Villagrasa adverts to the significance of ideology for most of the prominent figures                         
who laid the first bricks of “little Europe”. ​52 At the side of communist Altiero Spinelli,                               
socialist Paul-Henri Spaak, and liberal Carlo Sforza, Villagrasa mentions Konrad                   
Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Robert Schumann (Weiler adds Monnet),​53 all of                       
them Christians inspired in Maritain’s humanism, Mounier’s personalism or Sturzo’s                   
popularism.​54 
Kaiser questions the frequently accepted idea that the creation of the European Coal                         
and Steel Community was a compromise of national interests and emphasises “the                       
decisive role played by Christian democratic networks in setting a European agenda”                       
and their conscious intention to create Europeanised nation sates embedded in a                       
supranational system.​55 
For Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, research on Christian Democracy “pales when                     
compared to the effort that has gone into theorizing and investigating empirically the                         
twin political phenomena of socialism and social democracy”.​56 Yet Christian                   
Democracy and Social Democracy, together, shaped post-war European politics and                   
society. These authors consider it impossible to appreciate the impact of Social                       
Democracy, or even of understanding contemporary Europe altogether, without                 
taking into account Christian Democracy. In the neglect of Christian Democracy, they                       
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perceive the “deep difficulty” of many European studies scholars, “in grasping the                       
relationship between religion and politics…despite the central role of religion in the                       
emergence of modern, secular European societies.”​57 
Christian Democrats can credibly claim paternity of the idea of European integration,                       
and take pride in the success of the undertaking—Kalyvas & van Kersbergen assert.                         
The key place of Christian Democracy in the project brings not only historical clarity                           
but also a better understanding of the role that religion has played in the construction                             
of contemporary Europe.​58 Christian democracy’s influence appeared as much in                   
politics as in the welfare system, from prosperity to reconciliation, from the creation                         
of consensus about the most varied issues to the voluntary—if partial—surrender of                       
sovereignty to attain a higher and common good.​59 
Crucially, realisation of the essential place of Christian democracy in the European                       
project sheds light, in a very concrete way, on how religion and politics have played                             
out in contemporary Europe. To be sure, Christian democracy did not mean                       
institutional or ideological association of the political party with any church. Nor did                         
it mean involvement of Christian churches in politics—they moved away from direct                       
involvement in politics in order to keep their universalistic identities. Christian                     
democratic political parties were simultaneously Christian and secular. They drew                   
inspiration and values from Christianity—a cement that held their heterogeneous                   
social base together.​60​ Christian democratic political parties had a pivotal role 
…in anchoring new party systems in post-war Europe; in legitimizing the                     
market economy through social security and welfare provision; in the                   
introduction of corporatist forms of consensual policy making; and in                   
ending national frictions and rivalries by constructing the supranational                 
European Union in the early twenty-first century.​61 
Kalyvas & van Kersbergen question the mainstream assumption that the post-war era                       
in Europe had been mainly or exclusively a social-democratic one. Their research                       
regarding the function of religion in the political, social, and economic spheres in                         
contemporary Europe through Christian democracy can be extremely useful in three                     
ways. First, it challenges the assumption that Europe today is a purely secularist                         
product—separation of churches and state does not equate with non-existence of                     
religion in the configuration and life of the political community. Second, it reveals                         
that at least some secularist positions are also cultural worldviews. Third, it renews                         
perspectives to assess the growing importance of culture inspired in religion,                     
especially Islam. Part of Europe’s identity crisis today is reflected prominently in the                         
social sphere, though not only. As I will argue later on, in the ideological realm such                               
crisis comes from denial that Europe’s culture—also its political culture—partly                   
possesses a religious background (mainly Judeo-Christian so far).​62 The crisis reveals                     
incapacity to recognise and address the importance of religion (mainly Islam) in the                         
cultural background of a growing number of immigrants and citizens in Europe. 
In this section, we have seen how the social, economic and political ideals of the                             
European project were founded on core cultural values provided respectively by                     
Christianity, democratic socialism and Enlightenment liberalism.​63 This is why, for                   
Weiler, the project was successful both at the level of elites and at a broader societal                               
level. Europe’s recent past had been the negation of those 1950s values and ideals.                           
The European project provided for individuals and societies a way of dealing with                         
that recent past. Since there was a broad consensus on the values, the discussion                           
centred on ‘‘the political structure and the technology for their realization”.​64 In these                         
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shared ideals and culture, with tolerance towards different religious traditions                   
occupying a prominent place, the European project had a specific configuration, an                       
identity. 
2 Midlife crisis: challenges today 
Against the expectations of detractors, sceptics and critics, the project has been one of                           
the greatest successes in the history of Europe.​65 The fact that reconciliation (between                         
France and Germany, but not only), reconstruction, and taming of excessive (state-)                       
nationalism (at least at a continental scale) are not the problems they were in the                             
1950s, means that the European project reached its goals, at least to a certain                           
satisfactory extent. However, it appears to be in a “midlife crisis”.​66 Probably it is                           
natural that it should happen that way. After all, the EU encompasses not two (or six)                               
countries, but 27.​67 It represents not an economy in reconstruction but the largest                         
economy in the world. It holds a currency common to 17 of its members that has                               
rivalled the USA dollar in stability, and has become a popular reserve currency for                           
governments worldwide.​68 With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been able to                       
consolidate political integration as well as to coordinate efforts in foreign affairs and                         
immigration policy.​69 
The EU’s success and its capacity to attain important goals, has enabled it to grow. But                               
because of that, it faces new challenges. “Midlife crisis” does not need to have a                             
negative connotation: it can also describe a turning point or crossroads situation, like                         
the one the EU faces today, after generally successful first stages.​70 In the part of the                               
paper, I have attempted to describe the original objectives, the ideals that set the                           
European project in motion, gave it an identity, and made it successful.​71  
In this second part I will try to describe challenges that make the integration process                             
show some signs of exhaustion. Let us scan some current affairs to sketch those                           
challenges.​72 
2.1 The spectre of parallel societies 
Social integration is being challenged by the presence of new immigrants and/or                       
citizens of diverse cultural backgrounds. This is evident in the case of at least two                             
minorities already present in the EU: Roma and Muslims. Due to the complexity and                           
peculiarity of each of these issues, I will review only one of them and leave aside the                                 
other, which is by no means less important, since it has to do with Europe’s largest                               
minority.​73 Turkey’s potential accession to the EU and the resurgence of far-right                       
political parties in several Member States are linked with the Muslim minority issue. I                           
do not intend to analyse these phenomena in detail, but only emphasise their                         
importance and centrality in EU debates against the background of the first ideal of                           
integration, that of peaceful coexistence. 
Until recently, the assumption that liberalism can invariably mould open and free                       
societies has gone, by and large, uncontested. Now it is being questioned both at the                             
theoretical and at the empirical level. Jeremy Fortier, for one, claims that (Rawlsean)                         
liberalism “cannot separate itself from its Enlightenment origins” and from the                     
philosophic claims characteristic of enlightened liberalism.​74 Orgad warns against the                   
practice of an “illiberal liberalism” in United States and Europe.​75 A tension exists                         
between the desire to run society under liberal values—like openness and                     
tolerance—on the one hand, and the fear that if those very values are practised                           
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towards immigrants with different ideas and views, the liberal society will be                       
undermined.​76​ The cases that follow reflect this tension. 
During 2010, Germany was preoccupied with ‘‘the Sarrazin debate”. Thilo Sarrazin,                     
by then still a board member of the Bundesbank, published Deutschland schafft sich                         
ab: wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen (Germany does away with itself: how our                             
country is putting itself at risk)​77​, a book on Muslims in Germany (63% of whom are                               
Turkish). ​78 The publication attracted the attention not only of political or intellectual                         
elites but also ‘‘a mass following from the population at large”​79​. The issue was so                             
inflammatory that the Bundesbank started a complicated procedure to remove                   
Sarrazin from its Board and the SPD (Germany’s centre-left social democratic party) is                         
seeking to expel him from its ranks.​80 Chancellor Merkel deemed the comments as                         
‘‘completely unacceptable”.​81 
While distancing itself from what it described as inaccuracies or plain mistakes in                         
Sarrazin arguments, the German media still attempted to explain why the debate had                         
involved practically the whole nation. Though few in Germany would fully endorse                       
Sarrazin’s position (some of his views are allegedly racist), he verbalised a problem                         
that many would like to see addressed by the government, but few dare to speak                             
about: how to integrate immigrants and how to avoid the creation of parallel societies                           
within the country.​82 Sarrazin’s book quickly sold out. Bookshops asked for a new                         
edition. Researchers and academics presented arguments opposing it.​83 For some,                   
Sarrazin’s ideas were transforming Germany ‘‘from a tolerant society into one                     
dominated by fear and Islamophobia.”​84 Nonetheless, mainstream German               
politicians—including Chancellor Merkel—have begun to speak openly about the                 
failure of multiculturalism, and to call for new measures to integrate immigrants                       
more effectively. 
Simultaneously, two countries with an outstanding tradition of tolerance saw far-                     
right parties on the rise, to the point that those parties hold the balance for minority                               
governments to stay in power. In the Netherlands, the government relies on Geert                         
Wilders, famous for his controversial anti-Islam rhetoric.​85 In Sweden, the wining                     
centre-right Moderate Party, in order to achieve majority came to terms with the                         
Sweden Democrats, a far-right, anti-immigrant party which emerged from neo-Nazi                   
groupings in the 1980s.​86 The Sweden Democrats became kingmakers for the Speaker                       
of the House, the Moderate Party’s Per Westerberg.​87 Under Marine Le Pen, France’s                         
Front National has experienced a “renaissance”: she has received consistent support                     
at the polls and is expected to perform well at the presidential elections.​88 
Other recent affairs include the debate about the ban on wearing in public the Islamic                             
veil, particularly in France and Belgium, and on the construction of minarets in                         
Switzerland.​89 The rise of the far right or at least of an anti-immigration sentiment in                             
Europe is not limited to Sweden, Germany, Switzerland or the Netherlands: it is also                           
being strongly felt in Denmark, Austria, Hungary, France, and Italy.​90 The United                       
Kingdom has experienced several related problems as well, and since 2006 a legal                         
provision allows the Home Office to “take away your British citizenship if, in our                           
opinion, it would be in the public interest for us to do so and you would not be made                                     
stateless as a result of us removing British citizenship.”​91 Thwaites shows how                       
citizenship can be used “as a weapon” by a liberal society against its alleged illiberal                             
members.​92 She makes the case for a culturally neutral citizenship, which does not                         
equate to the liberal form: liberalism indeed possesses cultural assumptions held by                       
the majority and thence taken for granted as “neutral”. 
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The problems of immigration and the integration of culturally diverse minorities                     
cannot be fully understood without mention of the ‘‘civilisational” context that                     
characterises Europe today.​93 One of whose most tangible manifestations being the                     
slum of fertility rates to below replacement level (2.1 children per woman) across the                           
continent.​94 By some projections Europe’s population will soon start decreasing in                     
absolute terms, even after considering the effect of immigration.​95 This fact, unique in                         
the world,​96 has been interpreted by some as a sign of civilisational decline and lack of                               
hope in the future.​97 
The ideal of peaceful coexistence among Europeans (both traditional and new) seems                       
far from fully achieved. A fresh analysis, and the corresponding solutions will take                         
into account, however, the extent to which such ideal has already been realised so far,                             
so much so that the challenges reviewed in this section appear to today’s Europeans                           
as anomalous and extraordinary.​98 
2.2 Economic fragmentation 
The idea that a transnational currency may be able to survive without a state seemed                             
plausible at least until the Greek crisis at the beginning of 2010.​99 Since then,                           
economic integration has faced the possibility of derailing, creating several blocks                     
within an EU running at different speeds. Two groups are already evident: the                         
countries who have adopted the euro as their currency and those who have not.                           
However, with the sovereign debt crisis there were fears of an intra-euro-zone divide                         
developing between northern and southern (or ‘‘Mediterranean”) Member States.​100 
Risks to the euro’s stability during the financial crisis have brought proposals by the                           
EU Commission to regulate markets more closely, but also to tighten control over                         
Member State’s finances, with sanctions for those who do not maintain fiscal                       
discipline—a new stage of ‘‘economic governance”.​101 Not everybody agrees with this                     
step because it implies that nation state governments would have to give more                         
sovereignty to Brussels.​102 More importantly, many citizens (in Germany, Spain,                   
Portugal, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Bulgaria) have concerns about the                       
euro’s impact on their national economies.​103 There are even fears that the EU citizens                           
no longer feel well served by the single market and that the EU needs to revive the                                 
objective of the social market economy.​104 
Measures of fiscal discipline enacted by governments at the risk of debt default (not                           
only small economies like that of Greece, but the third and fourth biggest ones in the                               
EU—Italy and Spain—as well) have caused mixed feelings among the population, who                       
see the hard economic situation as a consequence of their membership in the EU                           
(rather than poor national management).Due largely to an impasse caused by a lack                         
of leadership on the politicians who could make a difference (see next section), the                           
eurozone peripheral difficulties became problems, and after months of ineffective                   
actions evolved into a crisis that is threatening not only the common currency but the                             
whole European project itself. The latest literature on the future Europe seems                       
everything but optimistic.​105 At the point in time when these lines are written the EU                             
could either advance towards greater economic coordination or split into two or more                         
economic groups.​106 
Since the 70s a “Werner Report” on monetary union foresaw that closer economic                         
cooperation would push towards political coordination as well. Eurozone member                   
countries accepted German-style monetary management as the price for keeping                   
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Germany at the heart of the European project. Fiscal targets were agreed in 1997, but                             
not observed. Wide differences between the productivity and competitiveness of                   
eurozone members remained unchanged, yet after adoption of the euro governments                     
lost two of three tools of adjustment (the third one being fiscal tightening):                         
devaluation of the national currency and movement of interest rates. The system                       
“was deliberately designed to have no defaults, no bailouts and no exits.” Credit                         
became relatively cheaper for many member countries on entering the eurozone.                     
And European banks expanded lending beyond their borders, including a major role                       
as creditors in the US real-estate market, seen as a safe investment until 2007. ​107 
The costs of breaking the euro would be enormous, there are no legal means of                             
leaving the currency, and a unilateral departure from it would mean separation from                         
the EU as well. According to economists of the USB the cost per citizen of a country                                 
leaving the euro would be around 10,000 euros. And history indicates that when                         
monetary unions break up extremes of civil disorder or even civil war follow.​108 The                           
crisis has revealed problems not only with a shared identity but also of trust between                             
peoples of Europe. It presents at the same time an opportunity to grow. As Nicholl has                               
argued, for the euro to last “a central bank with incontestable powers that is truly the                               
lender of last resort, and a body that can oversee fiscal harmony” must be built. Such                               
institutions 
…could take the political sting out of unpalatable tax rises and spending                       
cuts. It will not be politically sustainable…for one country [eg Germany] to                       
be telling the other [eg Greece¨] how to live. But it will be more acceptable                             
if strong European institutions are setting the terms for—and                 
delivering—Europe’s long-term prosperity.​109 
But does this mean that the EU should become a federal state? We will consider this                               
further along the paper (part 3). For the moment however I would like to stress, in                               
agreement with Maull, that “the present crisis is at its core political”. I would agree                             
even when by “crisis” what is meant is only economic crisis.​110 Let us look a bit more                                 
into the political problem. 
2.3 The eroding political impasse 
Political integration is weakening under pressure from three forces that pull the EU                         
in different ways. Euro-statists want the process to continue towards full union, the                         
closest thing possible to a strong federal state that provides, they believe, a more                           
definite and therefore stable situation.​111 They would fall under Weiler’s ‘‘union                     
vision” mentioned above. Intergovernmentalists push for devolution of as many                   
competences as possible ceded in the past to Brussels. For them the process has                           
already gone too far. Finally, advocates of a hybrid regime, those who favour Weiler’s                           
‘‘community vision”, see the present situation of the political integration process not                       
as an anomaly, but as the most desirable and workable state of affairs that needs only                               
to be perfected.​112 
All of them agree—and this is a widespread perception among EU citizens as                         
well—that as a polity the EU lacks sufficient legitimacy. Members of the European                         
Council (heads of governments) reach agreements without always consulting their                   
electorates. The Commission is subject to little accountability. Ministers and                   
permanent representatives in Brussels decide on new EU laws and policies behind                       
closed doors. The European Parliament is directly elected but lacks several powers of                         
a true legislature. Citizens have no direct say in appointments to the Court of Justice.                             
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There is no such thing as an EU public sphere yet. Few EU citizens vote for their                                 
representatives (members of the EU Parliament), and if they do, their vote follows                         
more the politics of their nation state than an EU-wide perspective.​113 This                       
“democratic deficit” is one of the most intricate present challenges in the political                         
field. 
For Euro-federalists, many problems not only in the political but also in the economic                           
and even the social fields can be solved only if the EU becomes a fully- fledged                               
democracy.​114 Whatever the possible solutions, the fact is that the EU is frequently                         
said to be experiencing a legitimacy crisis and to be facing a democratic deficit that                             
must be addressed. The early political ideal has encountered new challenges                     
especially in what is now a much larger but still stateless polity.​115 The way in which                               
the EU works politically makes it much slower than a ‘‘normal” (federal) polity.                         
Nevertheless, the amount of sovereignty that Member States have transferred to the                       
Union is already significant. 
2.4 Cultural radicalisation 
As has been seen above, in parallel with traditions originating from the                       
Enlightenment—including liberalism and social democracy—which share a secularist               
worldview, other influences have shaped contemporary Europe too. A very important                     
one is Christianity, and not only historically but also in the construction and evolution                           
of European integration. The debate in 2003 about whether to mention God and                         
religion in the European constitution was not accidental.​116 It reflected a genuine                       
concern from governments of different EU Member and Candidate States for whose                       
populations a transcendent dimension is important. Their respective national                 
constitutions attest to this: Germany, Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Spain, Poland and                     
Malta have specific references to God and/or Christianity in them.​117 In the UK, the                           
British Monarch is also “Defender of the Faith”, with a specific role in the established                             
(recognised by law) Christian Churches of England and Scotland.​118 
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that Christianity as a religion, in its                           
Anglican, Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant streams, is widely practiced in those                     
countries. It does not mean, either, that other countries do not adhere officially to a                             
fervent secularist tradition—France is an eminent example. Neither does it mean,                     
finally, that it is not possible to find official positions that represent a compromise                           
between Christianity and secularism, as the Polish Constitution shows.​119 It does                     
mean, however, that Christianity is an important element in the culture—also the                       
political culture—of contemporary Europe and of the European Union even today.                     
Such presence of Christianity in Europe’s political culture is subtle, and competes with                         
the dominant cultural paradigm in European politics today, that  of secularism.​120 
Secularism may refer simply to the pragmatic arrangement of relations between                     
religion and politics—church and state. Yet it could also denote a cultural position.                         
Using Casanova’s terms, secularism as ‘statecraft doctrine” seeks to keep the                     
separation between church and state, between religious and political authorities, or                     
the religious and the political.​121 Secularism becomes an ideology when the political                       
dimension demands for itself an absolute, quasi-sacred character; or when the secular                       
“arrogates for itself the mantle of rationality and universality, while claiming that                       
‘‘religion” is essentially nonrational, particularistic, and intolerant (or illiberal), and                   
as such dangerous and a threat to democratic politics once it enters the public                           
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sphere.”​122 One effect of ideological secularism is the widespread view in Western                       
Europe that religion is intolerant and creates conflict. However, this view “can hardly                         
be grounded empirically in the collective historical experience of European societies                     
in the twentieth century or in the actual personal experience of most contemporary                         
Europeans”.​123 Indeed, Casanova affirms, none of the massacres that occurred in                     
Europe between 1914 and 1989 “can be said to have been caused by religious                           
fanaticism and intolerance. All of them were rather the product of modern secular                         
ideologies.”​124 
Secularist ideology has the function “of positively differentiating modern secular                   
Europeans from ‘the religious other,’ either from pre-modern religious Europeans or                     
from contemporary non-European religious people,” the religious other in their                   
midst: Islam.​125 I suspect that one of the main reasons why the arrival and presence of                               
the “culturally other” (ie Muslims) has provoked so much turmoil in Europe is                         
precisely the grip that ideological secularism has had in public opinion, and on those                           
who can influence it the most. Ideological secularism equates progress, modernity                     
and Europeanness with the non-religious. Alternatively, it thinks of religion as pre-                       
modern, in need of enlightenment, and non-European. For this reason, United States                       
presents an uncomfortable puzzle: it is undeniable modern, but decidedly religious                     
too.​126 
Ideological secularism can be problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it does not                       
necessarily correspond to the reality of Europe. A privileged establishment is given to                         
Christian churches in England, Scotland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Malta,                   
Greece and other countries. In addition, special arrangements between state and                     
several Christian churches in areas like education, media, health and social services,                       
exist in Germany, Netherlands, and even France.​127 As Grace Davie shows, beside the                         
undeniable phenomenon of secularisation in Europe, another phenomenon has                 
become prominent: that of religion’s persisting salience and importance in the                     
European public sphere.​128 “Religion, it was widely assumed,” says Davie, “had been                       
‘dealt with’ in an earlier stage in European history and had become essentially a                           
private matter”; but it has re-appeared both dramatically and publicly.​129 
Secondly, ideological secularism can be problematic because it creates, perhaps                   
unintentionally, an unfriendly atmosphere to newcomers. It judges them not                   
according to their behaviour, but to their cultural background—especially when that                     
background is significantly shaped by religion, as in the case of Muslims. Secular                         
ideological elites that see religion with suspicion and as a threat to the public                           
sphere​130 are likely to exacerbate the problem of the encounter with Islam.​131 In the                           
third part of this paper, I will submit that one way to face these difficulties might be                                 
the construction of an inclusive public sphere. 
The European project, therefore, successful so far to a large extent, is undergoing                         
strains in all three areas: social, economic and political. The overwhelming political                       
cultural consensus at the foundation stages of the communities, allowed Europeans to                       
obviate debate about ideals, and focus instead on practical issues. As Europe reaches                         
60, the situation has changed. There is no longer a clear political cultural consensus.                           
Ideals and paradigms for integration should be revisited if the European project is to                           
survive. 
3. Ideals,identity and allegiance: revisiting integration 
paradigms 
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With Weiler, I would like to suggest that a renewed analysis of the ideals of                             
integration could explain not only why the process was so successful in the past, but                             
also what the constitutive elements (or identity) of the European project were. That                         
might in turn shed light on how the EU should address the challenges it faces today in                                 
the social, economic and political spheres. Table 2 provides a synthesised vision of the                           
ideals in their dynamic dimension: 
 
Table 2 – Original ideals, present challenges, future possibilities 
 
Ideal 
Stag
e 
Social  Economic  Political  Culture 
Original  Peace  Prosperity  Supranationalism  Bible & Enlightenmen
t 
Present  Parallel 
societie
s 
Fragmentation  Impasse  Radicalisatio
n 
Future  Inter- 
culturalis
m 
Differentiat
ed 
cooperation 
Analogical unity  Blende
d 
culture 
 
What follows is a proposal on how those ideals might be revisited and pursued into                             
the future. 
3.1 Reciprocal social openness: interculturalism 
In the social sphere, the intercultural paradigm would translate into mutual                     
openness. In Davie’s words “Islam must adapt to Europe…but Europe must also adapt                         
to Islam.”​132 “Europe” includes both, the Enlightenment and the Bible (or                     
Judeo-Christian) traditions.​133 Acknowledging these two sources of Europe’s cultural                 
configuration is the best starting point in the dialogue with the culturally different                         
newcomers.​134​ In Weiler’s words: 
True tolerance—as that discipline of the soul which resists the tendency to                       
coerce the other—can only exist against a basic affirmation of certain                     
truths. And there is a contempt for the other, not respect, in an ‘‘everything                           
goes attitude”. How can I respect the identity of the other if I do not respect                               
my own identity?​135 
The first step in order to start an open and sincere dialogue with Muslims—and to ask                               
the same from them—is the acknowledgement that the sources of European political                       
culture include the Enlightenment and religion (until recently, mainly Judeo-                   
Christianity). Realisation of religion’s influence in the political culture of both—                     
Europeans and Muslims coming to Europe—might, after all, work as a bridge for                         
reciprocal  understanding,  communication and  harmonious integration. Jenkins 
highlights how the Kantian notion of enlightened autonomy commands, among other                     
elements “independence of culture and religion”.​136 Wherever the ‘stranger’s culture                   
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and religion do not fit into what in reality is just another cultural position—that of                             
individualistic liberalism—it immediately receives the label of irrationality and                 
therefore underdevelopment. This labelling has disastrous consequences in terms of                   
reciprocal social engagement because it deprives the other of critical speech.​137                     
Moderate perspectives familiar with secular, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim positions,                   
such as Habermas’s, Taylor’s, Rabbi David Rosen’s or Talal Assad’s are useful and                         
helpful, especially when they involve dialogue and exchange of ideas.​138 Yet this is not                           
always the predominant attitude in mainstream Western intellectual circles,                 
particularly in Europe. Jenkins brings to attention how often enlightened (secularist)                     
authors conflate “Europe” with “Enlightenment”, and leave no space for the                     
continent’s transformation.​139 
The second step is of course for all those living permanently in Europe to realise that                               
they might have to be with each other for a long time. There is no way to improve the                                     
situation without first acknowledging it. One can tolerate, with a respectful ignorance,                       
someone travelling on the same train for a few hours. But living with that person in                               
the same house for a year is altogether different. The frame of mind one has in either                                 
situation changes. While possible dialogue and knowledge of the other can be                       
obviated in the first case, it cannot in the second case. And true dialogue demands                             
that the parties in conversation are ready not to leave their own cultural positions (or                             
deny them in a veil of ignorance), but to acknowledge that each of them has a cultural                                 
background, while trying to reach to the other looking for common ground present in                           
their respective cultures, a transcultural dialogue therefore. 
The third step is to engage in a certainly difficult but necessary and productive                           
dialogue to create a new way of life—and a new political culture— together.                         
Casanova, Taylor, D’Andrea, Beuchot, van Leeuwen and others, have suggested                   
possible avenues.​140 What those proposals have in common is the idea that respect                         
and tolerance are not enough: they are only the beginning. Social integration will only                           
happen through exchange and interaction among the different cultural groups. And                     
the result will be a new, richer, and common culture. Dialogue goes beyond discourse,                           
to new ways of life together. That is what I mean by reciprocal social openness. It                               
ought to be based on a different paradigm: interculturalism.​141 The dialogue cannot be                         
limited to understanding basic principles and reaching agreement on minimal                   
standards and procedures. It ought to include the sharing and discussing of values,                         
considerations of “thin” and “thick” identities alike, and the realisation of the                       
dynamic character of identity.​142 
Sincere and open dialogue does not mean, as we have said, ignoring the other’s                           
culture. Neither does it not mean necessarily accepting everything either, or                     
renouncing one's own identity. Intercultural dialogue requires the capacity to listen                     
and to answer. It implies a disposition that is critical—also self-critical. In addition, it                           
presupposes the gradual construction of a new society together, a new way of life and                             
a new culture with elements of both the traditional and the newcomer groups.​143 
In recent times, the dominant paradigm to deal with cultural diversity has been                         
multiculturalism. This is particularly true of western academic circles, but also to                       
some extent of political and policy-making elites. Multiculturalism denotes sometimes                   
a fact: the presence of peoples with varied cultural backgrounds in a (“multicultural”)                         
society. Under a second meaning, it can be a normative theory, a liberal approach to                             
how coexistence of peoples with differing and even potentially conflicting                   
backgrounds ought to be managed. Here by “multiculturalism” I understand the                     
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second meaning. 
Multiculturalism had the virtue of providing an alternative to assimilation for                     
cultural groups living in polities dominated by a culturally different majority. This                       
seems to have been the situation faced by linguistically different communities in                       
France—for instance those speaking Breton and Occitan.​144 Multiculturalism was                 
introduced in the nineteen seventies in Australia and Canada. It has had advocates                         
and inspired policy in several other Western countries as well. Prominent examples                       
in Europe include for instance Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.                       
Multiculturalism is widely known in academic literature. Recognised scholars such as,                     
among others, Will Kymlicka, have developed it.​145 For him, multiculturalism is “an                       
umbrella term” that covers “a wide range of policies designed to provide some level of                             
public recognition, support or accommodation to non-dominant ethno- cultural                 
groups, whether those groups are ‘new’ minorities (e.g. immigrant and refugees) or                       
‘old’ minorities (e.g. historically settled national minorities and indigenous                 
peoples).”​146 
However, multiculturalism has also been criticised on several counts.​147 One is that                       
when applied, precisely because of its stress on the value of individual cultural                         
communities and their need to be preserved and protected from discrimination, it                       
may lead those minority communities and, in fact, the majority community also to                         
grow isolated from each other. They might tend to become parallel societies.                       
Multiculturalism has been a very good first step in the search for alternatives to                           
assimilation. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be enough. 
Recognition of and respect for minorities present in the political community does not                         
bear, of itself, social cohesion. It is under this perspective that Chancellor Angela                         
Merkel’s recent remarks about the failure of multiculturalism should be pondered.​148                     
She is known for her moderate views, and surely she is not suggesting expelling                           
millions of residents of Muslim background (mainly Turks) from Germany, just                     
because their integration in German society appears to be difficult.​149 
Interculturalism implies going beyond parallel societies respectful of each other. It                     
entails a degree of cultural blending.​150 Two prerequisites for intercultural dialogue                     
are first, acknowledgement that individuals and human groups (including the                   
majority or recipient group in a country) are “cultural”—possessing culture.​151 And,                     
secondly, communication with the aid of a “transcultural grammar” based on a basic                         
notion of equality among human beings.​152 
Culture is always part of people’s character, and yet it does not explain them                           
completely. Culture evolves, and several cultural sources may characterise not only a                       
group, but also individuals. An interculturalist perspective will assert that every                     
human being (or group) is “cultural” and at the same time, that this does not exhaust                               
the explanation of what they are: there is more to them than their culture. That                             
“more” transcends cultures—is transcultural—and can serve as a point for                   
intercultural dialogue and communication. Table 3 presents these ideas in a                     
schematic way: 
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Table 3 – Conceptual location of interculturalism 
 
Theory  Monoculturalism  Multiculturalism  Interculturalism 
Tool  Assimilation  Tolerance  Exchange 
Situation  Alienation  Isolation  Integration 
Result  Homogenise
d society 
Parallel societies  Blended society 
 
Interculturalism has already been presented as an alternative to multiculturalism in                     
different cases. Bouchard & Taylor’s proposal for Quebec is only one example. Among                         
other elements, they suggest “intercommunity action with a view to overcoming                     
stereotypes and defusing fear or rejection of the Other taking advantage of the                         
enrichment that derives from diversity, and benefiting from social cohesion.”​153                   
According to their proposal, “the majority ethno-cultural group, like the members of                       
ethno-cultural minorities accept that their culture will be transformed sooner or later                       
through interaction”.​154 Importantly, “…[c]ultural, and in particular, religious               
differences need not be confined to the private domain. The following logic underpins                         
this choice: it is healthier to display our differences and get to know those of the Other                                 
than to deny or marginalize them.”​155 What an intercultural society in Europe could                         
look like in 20 or 30 years remains of course a matter of speculation. Yet it ought to                                   
include, among other elements, three essential cultural streams that are already                     
present in Europe—even if by “Europe” we think only of EU member states:                         
Christianity—a minority today but with an important place in Europe’s cultural                     
configuration; secularism—the majority culture today; and Islam—the fastest growing                 
minority, already undeniably significant in the continent.​156 
In a multiculturalist scenario various cultures and groups are recognised, and                     
“tolerated”. They remain, however, always different from each other. Those                   
individuals and groups, whose culture is closer to the main, dominant culture, will be                           
more inclined to pay allegiance to the political community. Individuals and groups                       
with cultures farther away from the main culture will continue to feel alien—even                         
after two or three generations of having arrived to the host country—and their                         
allegiance will be much weaker, if existent at all. In the interculturalist scenario the                           
initially distant cultural positions, through communication and exchange, slowly                 
achieve degrees of blending, in a way that after some time they have constituted a                             
richer culture together—one whose paternity everybody can claim. One way to                     
achieve this has been developed by Pierpaolo Donati through what he calls “relational                         
sociology”.​157 
Interculturalism needs to be developed further theoretically, and appropriately tested                   
empirically. Here I have wanted to at least bring it to attention as an alternative to the                                 
multiculturalist paradigm of social coexistence. But other paradigms of integration                   
must be revisited as well. Let us give a thought now to the economic paradigm. 
3.2 Differentiated economic cooperation 
European integration in general and economic integration in particular should also                     
be conceived in a different way, adapted to the new situation in which the European                             
project finds itself today. As I have tried to show in the first section, this project was                                 
not a purely economic arrangement based on self-interest and otherwise ignorant or                       
mindless of whom the partners were. Economic cooperation was a tool, not the main                           
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goal. Even in the EU as it is today—let alone one with more members—economic                           
cooperation is already problematic and governance very difficult.​158 There has been                     
talk among European leaders about reforming the Treaty of Lisbon to deal with                         
indebted euro zone States in crisis (like Greece).​159 We have already mentioned how                         
thorny the issue of possible EU taxes is. In face of this situation, Vivien Schmidt                             
plausibly has advanced the idea of differentiated cooperation, a “Europe à la carte.”​160 
Schmidt’s proposal is both pragmatic and deeply insightful especially on two counts.                       
First, she observes that in practice the EU has already dropped the ideal of uniformity                             
and unanimity. Second, she points out that there are different conceptions of the                         
EU—its identity—that cannot be easily reconciled. A “Menu Europe” may be in part a                           
description of what is happening in the integration process, but is also a normative                           
position on the possible way ahead. 
For Schmidt, four normative visions of the EU are already present in the academic                           
and political debates about European integration.​161 The first one, held according to                       
her by the UK, the Scandinavian countries and some central and eastern European                         
countries, is the EU as “a borderless, problem-solving entity ensuring free markets                       
and regional security.”​162 The second one, held by the founding Six (Germany, France,                         
Luxemburg, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium) plus Austria thinks of the EU rather as “a                         
bordered, values-based community.”​163 A third conception “attributed to the                 
Commission” and to philosophers like Habermas, Beck and Grande, would have the                       
EU as “a border-free, rights-based, post-national union.”​164 A final, fourth idea, which                       
Schmidt attributes to President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and the British ex- Prime                         
Minister Gordon Brown, sees the EU in strategic terms, as a global player acting                           
through multilateralism, humanitarian aid and peacekeeping.​165 
Schmidt’s account of the different visions of Europe may not be comprehensive. For                         
instance, she does not mention the perspective under which the EU would be mainly a                             
vehicle for the “European Social Model” conceptualised by, among others, Anthony                     
Giddens.​166 She does not abound on “Eastern” or “Southern” European perspectives                     
much either.​167 The political form that she proposes for the EU—a “Region-State”—is                       
not altogether convincing, especially considering the political ideals analysed in the                     
first section of this paper. Yet, nowhere does Schmidt express the intention to give a                             
comprehensive account of the normative conceptions of the EU, nor is she specially                         
concerned about the precise terms with which she will express her idea of the EU—its                             
identity.​168 
Schmidt emphasises the variable membership of EU institutions. The UK and                     
Denmark have opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty. The Schengen open-border                   
includes non-members such as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, while the UK and                       
Ireland remain out, as do Bulgaria and Romania temporarily. Denmark is not in the                           
European security and defence policy.​169 The euro-zone includes only 17 out of 27                         
Member States, plus three micro- (and non-member) states (Monaco, San Marino and                       
the Vatican) which use the euro as their official currency.​170 Bulgaria and Romania                         
will not enjoy worker freedom of movement for several years yet. The Bologna                         
process for higher education harmonisation includes some non-Member States, whilst                   
some Members like the UK, did not join it. The Eastern partnerships process launched                           
in 2009 also involves non-Member States.​171 
Differentiated cooperation may appear as a somewhat chaotic avenue for the                     
European project.​172 Yet it could allow countries with different conceptions of the EU                         
to engage in closer cooperation with like-minded partners.​173 It would require,                     
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though, changes in the paradigm for political integration. This we will ponder next. 
3.3 An analogical unity for the European polity 
Under conditions of social interculturalism and differentiated economic integration,                 
the EU regime should be conceived in innovative terms too. Schmidt has suggested                         
that the Commission could adopt the role of “regional ‘‘community organizer” or an                         
administrative support link, as in the Bologna process for higher education.”​174 These                       
ideas require further reflection. A stateless polity, with some resemblance of a state                         
but short of being one, could be more compatible with political integration as it has                             
been conceived from the beginning. Differentiated cooperation might allow for small                     
groups of like-minded countries to enhance political union in quasi-federal terms, for                       
instance the founding Six, or the members of the Nordic Council.​175 It could also allow                             
those joining cooperation in a certain area to have active participation in                       
decision-making regarding that area. Additionally, it would permit countries which                   
do not wish to extend cooperation in for them difficult or sensitive fields to stay out of                                 
specific agreements, without being deemed “anti-European”.​176 
There could be possible inconveniences to this approach. One is that the different                         
conceptions about what the identity of EU ought to be do not necessarily match                           
perfectly with the identity of national populations. Beyond clichés, not every British                       
person is a Eurosceptic or every French individual a Euro-federalist. Decisions in one                         
country to undertake cooperation with others might encounter strong opposition                   
within the country itself. Yet this already happens inside Member States under the                         
present structure of the EU. Another risk is that certain areas of cooperation or                           
exclusion were in practice very difficult to separate, for instance free-trade with free-                         
movement of labour. The idea, notwithstanding, is worth exploring. 
At any rate, the unity of the European polity ought not to be conceived as that of a                                   
state, be it national or even multinational. Differentiated cooperation would require                     
an alternative, analogical conception of political unity, one corresponding to a                     
stateless, supranational polity.​177 
One way to foster political unity could be to apply the idea of “institutional belonging”                             
provided the institutions are neutral.​178 In the European context, this would mean                       
that a national-like identity is not essential, provided—extrapolating Balint’s                 
ideas—that the EU institutions were effective and culturally impartial.​179 At the same                       
time, institutions of themselves will not necessarily create allegiance. Their face, their                       
identity as institutions may mean very little to citizens—something that seems to                       
happen in the EU and has concerned scholars and politicians alike.​180 
Whatever the source of cohesion for the political community, unity ought to be                         
considered as weaker than, and subordinated to, the national (or even the regional)                         
kind.​181 To put it bluntly, Europeans are likely to be less enthusiastic about paying                           
taxes to the EU than to their national states.​182 Whether Europeans are ready to make                             
sacrifices for Europe will depend, most certainly, on what “Europe” is, its identity as a                             
polity. Even more importantly, it will depend on who the “Europeans” are—their                       
personal and group identities are changing rapidly. Analogical unity can be conceived                       
once these elements are taken into account. 
In order to illustrate the idea of analogical unity I would like to bring to attention                               
Joseph Weiler’s Principle of Constitutional Tolerance. This principle is an example, in                       
the realm of constitutional law, of analogical unity, and it has been already at work                             
throughout the history of European integration.​183 
In the European constitutional landscape, Weiler notes, “Community norms trump                   
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conflicting Member State norms.” This hierarchy however, “is not rooted in a [top to                           
bottom], but rather on a “bottom-to-top hierarchy of authority and real power.” For                         
Weiler this singularity shows the Grundnorm of the European constitutional                   
construct. He calls it Principle of constitutional tolerance (PCT).​184 
The political organisation of the EU in good part reflects this principle of tolerance                           
and defies the normal premise of constitutionalism. In an ordinary constitutional                     
state, where the polity understands itself as being constituted of one people, the                         
minority accepts the authority of the majority. The bending of a minority to the                           
authority of a majority, when this minority does not consider itself as belonging to the                             
same people “is usually regarded as subjugation”. And still, 
…in the Community, we subject the European peoples to constitutional                   
discipline even though the European polity is composed of distinct peoples.                     
It is a remarkable instance of civic tolerance to accept to be bound by                           
precepts articulated, not by ‘my people’, but by a community composed of                       
distinct political communities: a people, if you wish, of ‘others’.​185 
Under the PCT, the member states accept the European constitutional discipline not                       
because they are subordinated to a federal state, part of whose constitutional demos                         
they are. They accept it as “an autonomous voluntary act, endlessly renewed on each                           
occasion, of subordination,” in areas governed by a European norm which is an                         
aggregated expression of other political communities. This “creates in itself a                     
different type of political community, one unique feature of which is that very                         
willingness to accept a binding discipline which is rooted in, and derives from a                           
community of others.” 
The French or the Italians or the Germans are told: in the name of the                             
peoples of Europe you are invited to obey…When acceptance and                   
subordination are voluntary, and repeatedly so, they constitute an act of                     
true liberty and emancipation from collective self-arrogance and               
constitutional fetishism: a high expression of constitutional tolerance.​186 
The PCT reflects a peculiar polity and a sort of unity that has at least three                               
characteristics: 1) it is like the unity in a federal state; 2) but it is not exactly that; 3) it                                       
is partly similar, and partly different. This is why I mean by analogical unity.​187                           
Europe is not a demos, but a collection of demoi. The European demoi have in fact                               
paid allegiance to the European project as it has been, always as a community of                             
peoples, never as a people. A European polity based on this analogical unity is more                             
likely to stay together, but it is also more plausible because it respects the autonomy                             
of the parts, it is a real “unity in diversity”. If, as I am convinced, national diversity is                                   
a treasure to Europe—in its languages, just to mention one example—then analogical                       
unity ought to continue being the way of keeping the polity together. 
Analogical unity, as the PCT shows, relies on something different to a legal obligation.                           
It presupposes willingness, in other words a free assent to act even if there is no                               
punishment (say, a fee) for not acting. Solidarity, for example, cannot be dictated by                           
law and presupposes such free assent. It will be easier among those who see                           
themselves as equals, and even more, as part of the same (not a parallel) community                             
of peoples. In a democratic polity equality finds formal expression in citizenship and                         
actual realisation in an inclusive public sphere. To that we now turn. 
3.4 An inclusive European public sphere 
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In the second part of this paper we mentioned three very significant sources                         
informing the political culture of Europe: the Enlightenment, Christianity and Islam.                     
Representatives of these streams have already contributed with interesting ideas to                     
this discussion.​188 Christians and Muslims are minorities in Europe and they know it.                         
For all their long history of coexistence and conflict,​189 they are in dialogue based on                             
some common ground.​190 This is not always obvious for the secularist                     
establishment,​191 who face the double challenge of recognising that the majority                     
cultural stand is a cultural stand, on the one hand; and that religious positions,                           
including Islam, can only be ignored at their peril, on the other.​192 Nor can it be                               
denied that within religious communities there are some who do not want any                         
dialogue. Nevertheless, the only way forward for Europe seems to be                     
acknowledgement that culture plays a role in human beings’ and groups’ lives, and                         
that only through constructive exchange—also in cultural terms—parallel societies                 
can acquire a certain level of blending and integration to form a new, culturally                           
richer community. 
The way is certainly not easy, but neither is it impossible. History provides evidence                           
of intolerance and persecution on religious grounds, under Christian and Muslim                     
rules. But Secularism can also be intolerant and even persecute religion.​193 To a                         
society harmonised through interculturalism (see above) corresponds an inclusive                 
political atmosphere.​194 As in the case of interculturalism, differentiated cooperation,                   
and analogical unity, my intention here is not to develop a practical proposal of an                             
inclusive public sphere, but to indicate it as a possible and desirable avenue for future                             
European integration.​195 Interesting ideas for an inclusive public sphere have come                     
from thinkers pertaining to diverse cultural political traditions.​196 Due to lack of space                         
here I will refer to only one.​197 
Jürgen Habermas distinguishes between “the normative demands of a liberal order”                     
and “the functional social imperatives of modernization”, which among other things                     
demands “the secularization of state authority.”​198 Secular citizens must adjust to a                       
new situation, that of post-secular societies, where religious communities continue to                     
exist (i.e. did not disappear according to the Modern myth). At the same time, believer                             
citizens take it for granted that the atmosphere is increasingly secular and that they                           
must learn to live in it. In other words, secular and religious citizens must learn to                               
live in disagreement about certain issues with each other.​199 This realisation must                       
motivate citizens of either group not only to speak in terms that the other may                             
understand, but also to help those with a different worldview to “translate” their                         
claims into a language understood by all. The “common language” for Habermas is                         
secular, but the effort of translation from religious to secular on the part of believers,                             
must be matched with an effort of interpretation of religiously inspired claims on the                           
part of non-believers: “secular citizens must open their minds to the possible truth                         
content of those presentations and enter into dialogues from which religious reasons                       
then might well emerge in the transformed guise of generally accessible                     
arguments.”​200 
In order for secular citizens not to become secularist, they must adopt a self- critical                             
view of the limits of secular reason (as religious citizens become critical of religion).​201                           
Indeed, there can be pathologies (for instance fanaticism) of religion as well as                         
pathologies of reason (e.g. scientism). “Religion must continually allow itself to be                       
purified and structured by reason”, while (secular) reason can benefit as well from                         
the enrichment of faith and religion.​202 
Real neutrality or—as I have preferred to call it—inclusiveness in the public sphere,                         
requires citizens to become aware of the distinction between secular and secularist.                       
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One thing is a secular arrangement of the state. Another, very different, is a secularist                             
worldview erected into the official weltanschauung of the political community’s                   
public sphere. Citizens, and indeed authorities in the political community, are                     
required to adopt at least an agnostic stance towards religion and religious citizens.​203                         
The agnostic citizen grants religion and religiously inspired claims in the public                       
sphere, a potential of truth. This observation, concludes Habermas, 
…paves the way for a dialectical understanding of cultural                 
secularization…of public consciousness in Europe as a learning process                 
that affects and changes religious and worldly mentalities by forcing the                     
tradition of the Enlightenment as well as the religious doctrines to reflect                       
on their respective limits.​204 
What interculturalism is for the social context, inclusiveness in the public sphere is                         
for the cultural realm. As watered down as the political identity of Europe should be                             
in our view, the polity still needs a link among its members to keep it together. That                                 
link can be strengthened through an inclusive public sphere, whose most prominent                       
outcome is a common political culture. 
One of the theories about why dinosaurs became extinct relates these formidable                       
creatures’ incapacity to diversify before changing conditions.​205 The European project                   
has been greatly successful so far, but whether it can expect a better fate than that of                                 
dinosaurs is still an open question. Europe’s “ecosystem”, its local and global                       
environment, is changing rapidly. In order to earn and keep the allegiance of its                           
citizens, the European polity must adapt gracefully and renew its paradigms of                       
integration. It must promote social spaces for intercultural openness. It must conceive                       
integration under flexible and differentiated schemes. It must aspire to an analogical                       
unity, which has some resemblance with national unities but aspires to a more                         
modest result. Finally, It must acknowledge and engage with the different cultural                       
streams that matter to citizens today. 
If the identity, the configuration of the European polity, corresponds at least in part                           
with the identities of citizens and their cultural, social, and national contexts today,                         
there will be some allegiance. Then it will be time to ponder how far such loyalty can                                 
go. 
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